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John B. Hattendorf
THE IDEa OF a “FLEET IN BEING”  
IN HISTORICaL PERSPECTIvE
 the phrase “fleet in being” is one of those troublesome terms that naval his-torians and strategists have tended to use in a range of different meanings. 
the term first appeared in reference to the naval battle off beachy Head in 1690, 
during the Nine years’ War, as part of an excuse that admiral arthur Herbert, 
first earl of torrington, used to explain his reluctance to engage the french fleet 
in that battle. a later commentator pointed out that the thinking of several brit-
ish naval officers ninety years later during the War for american Independence, 
when the royal Navy was in a similar situation of inferior strength, contributed 
an expansion to the fleet-in-being concept. to examine this subject carefully, it is 
necessary to look at two separate areas: first, the development of the idea of the 
fleet in being in naval strategic thought, and, second, the ideas that arose in the 
royal Navy during the War of the american revolution. 
THe concePT in HiSTorY
as a strategic concept, “fleet in being” became a point of discussion among naval 
strategists in 1891, with the publication of vice admiral Philip Colomb’s book 
naval warfare.1 In this work Colomb pointed to the origins of the phrase with 
admiral lord torrington in his speech before Parliament explaining the ratio-
nale for his actions in the battle of beachy Head (Cap béveziers). In that action, 
the comte de tourville, with seventy-five french ships of the line, had defeated 
the fifty-six ships of the anglo-dutch fleet under torrington’s overall command 
on 30 June/10 July 1690.2 When torrington was called before Parliament to 
explain his defeat, he reputedly declared, “as it was, most Men were in fear that 
the french wou’d invade; but I was always of another opinion, which several 
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members of this Honorable House can witness: for I always said, that whilst we 
had a fleet in being, they would not dare to make an attempt.”3 
there is some question about the authenticity of the phrase “fleet in being” in 
that quotation, as it does not appear in the contemporary manuscript records of 
torrington’s speech;4 it is known only from an anonymously prepared pamphlet 
that purports to be the speech, published twenty years after the event, in 1710.5 
In a preface to the reader, the publisher of the 1710 pamphlet explained, “the 
following speech falling into my hands by accident, and being pleas’d with the 
History it relates; I thought it might give the World a great deal of satisfaction if it 
were made publick.”6 those words might well impress a skeptical historian as the 
tone of invention, but be that as it may. Whether or not torrington actually used 
the phrase in 1690, it is one that has certainly taken on a life of its own during the 
three hundred years that have followed. 
among naval strategists, Philip Colomb was the first in the anglophone world 
to draw attention to the idea as a broad strategic principle, and his thinking de-
veloped into an exchange of differing opinions between such well-known writers 
as alfred thayer Mahan and sir Julian Corbett. later writers, such as Herbert 
richmond, raoul Castex, Herbert rosinski, and geoffrey till, have commented 
on their exchange and added their own thoughts in the process.
Colomb himself, in light of the controversy that he had raised in 1891, tried to 
clarify his thinking in a revised third edition of his work, eight years later: “lord 
torrington, in his definition of the principle, went no farther than to assert that 
while he observed the enemy’s fleet with one certainly inferior, but yet not so in-
ferior as to be debarred from offering battle on any advantageous circumstances 
appearing, it would be paralysed.”7 While this convoluted wording took into ac-
count some of the criticism that had been made of Colomb’s initial understanding 
of the battle, he believed that the general principle should go farther: “‘a fleet in 
being,’ even though it was discredited, inferior, and shut up behind sand banks, 
was such a power in observation as to paralyze the action of an apparently victori-
ous fleet either against ‘sea or shore.’”8 stating the concept again elsewhere in the 
same work, Colomb wrote, “a ‘fleet in being’ has come into general use to denote 
what, in naval affairs, corresponds to ‘a relieving army’ in military affairs. that 
is to say, a fleet which is able and willing to attack an enemy proposing a descent 
upon territory which that force has it in charge to protect.”9
Captain Mahan’s biography of admiral lord Nelson included a telling criti-
cism of Colomb’s concept of the idea of a fleet in being. Writing about Nelson’s 
1794 landing at Calvi in Corsica, Mahan declared that Nelson’s actions in that 
operation showed the weakness of the fleet-in-being concept. If Nelson had been 
in tourville’s place, Mahan wrote, tourville would not have thought the opposing 
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english force, as a fleet in being, would be any kind of a deterrent to making a 
landing.10 
Colomb responded by saying that Mahan misunderstood the fleet-in-being 
concept. He argued that Mahan himself, through his service as a member of the 
U.s. War board during the spanish-american War of 1898, had become associat-
ed with one of the most extreme examples in history of the potential effectiveness 
of a fleet in being when U.s. forces had been deterred for a time from capturing 
santiago de Cuba by the spanish navy’s fleet in being, a squadron under admiral 
Pascual Cervera.11 Mahan, however, would have none of it. Using an example 
from the Peloponnesian War, Mahan pointed out that during the athenian 
expedition to syracuse, the syracusans moved their inferior fleet to tarentum. 
“the momentary safety of syracuse would illustrate the influence of a ‘fleet in 
being’; its subjugation after the fall of tarentum would show the limitations of 
such a fleet, which, by definition, is inferior.”12 Mahan felt that “the exaggerated 
argument about the ‘fleet in being’ and its deterrent effect is, in effect, assuming 
that war can and will be made only without risk.”13 that is, “it was not the beaten 
and crippled english and dutch ‘fleet in being’ that prevented an invasion of 
england. It was the weakness or inertness of tourville, or the unreadiness of the 
french transports.”14 Underscoring a related general point, Mahan noted that 
when a fleet is tied to defending a position ashore that is otherwise inadequately 
protected by fortification or by an army, it is unable to concentrate or move freely 
and forcefully against an enemy.15
sir Julian Corbett took a different stance when he pointed out that a fleet in 
being is a legitimate method of disputing command of the sea by assuming a 
defensive attitude. He argued that historical misunderstanding about the circum-
stances that had given rise to the phrase and the subsequent limitation of the con-
cept to deterrence against an amphibious landing obscured the full significance 
of the strategic concept. “for a maritime Power, then,” Corbett wrote, “a naval 
defensive means nothing but keeping the fleet actively in being—not merely in 
existence, but in active vigorous life.”16 In Corbett’s interpretation, torrington’s 
intention was to act on the defensive and to prevent the enemy from achieving 
any result until such time as torrington could consolidate his scattered forces 
so as to have a fair chance of winning a fleet engagement with tourville’s fleet. 
“the doctrine of the ‘fleet in being,’ as formulated and practiced by torrington,” 
Corbett explained, “goes no further than this, that where the enemy regards the 
general command of a sea necessary to his offensive purposes, you may be able 
to prevent his gaining such command by using your fleet defensively, refusing 
what Nelson called a general battle, and seizing every opportunity for a counter-
strike.”17 Corbett concluded that those who criticized torrington at the time—as 
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well as those who had since used the historical example for developing a strategic 
principle—did not understand that the meaning of a fleet in being was at sea and 
in contact with an enemy.
later commentators have continued this discussion but have achieved little 
resolution of the conceptual problems involved. admiral raoul Castex favored 
Mahan’s argument over Corbett’s.18 Castex thought Colomb’s argument exagger-
ated and Corbett an inexperienced civilian, harshly judging him as “an armchair 
strategist ignorant of the reality of war.”19 In contrast, admiral sir Herbert rich-
mond followed Corbett’s view and added his own thoughts. “What torrington 
meant is plain,” richmond wrote. “so long as he had an active fleet, prepared to 
seize any opportunity of slipping past the french and joining the score of [eng-
lish] ships to the west, tourville, despite his superior numbers, could not commit 
himself to a major operation.”20 an inferior fleet, richmond pointed out, could 
not prevent a raid and could not be an absolute or complete safeguard, only a 
temporary one. However, in a situation where a superior enemy fleet needed 
to obtain a rapid and decisive victory, to disable completely an inferior fleet to 
carry out an invasion or some other larger objective, the inferior fleet can have 
a temporary deterrent effect. It does this by avoiding action until such time as 
conditions might be more favorable, as the english eventually did in that war two 
years after beachy Head, in 1692, as well as afterward.21 
In the next generation of naval strategic thinkers, the german american 
Herbert rosinski started in the 1930s a comparative study of maritime strategic 
thinkers, of which he completed only the section devoted to Mahan.22 In this 
work, rosinski noted that Mahan agreed completely with Corbett that “‘dispute 
of command,’ if attempted at all, can only be achieved by the greatest display 
of activity and offensive spirit conceivable.”23 rosinski went on to exclaim, “It 
is therefore more than astonishing to find [Mahan] throughout all his writ-
ings violently opposed to the concept of a ‘fleet in being,’ which when rightly 
understood, stands precisely for such a watchful and aggressive ‘hanging on the 
enemy’s flanks.’”24 looking carefully at Mahan’s reasoning, rosinski concluded 
that Mahan had taken torrington to mean a passive retreat to safety—the very 
opposite of what torrington had actually intended, an aggressive defense. one 
might add that Mahan’s understanding was similar to that which the king, queen, 
and council expressed in 1690 and that led to torrington’s dismissal, imprison-
ment in the tower, and trial.25 
While naval historians and strategists have tended to study the concept as an 
abstract strategic idea, historians of the reign of King William III and the after-
math of the revolution of 1688 are aware that there may have been other reasons 
why admiral Herbert (that is, torrington) did not fight the french, as he had 
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been ordered to do. as the historian stephen b. baxter summarized the range 
of possibilities, “He [torrington] may have resented the orders of the cabinet 
council. He may have been involved in the political squabbles that were almost 
destroying the fighting capacity of the english navy. He may have been jealous of 
the dutch. He may have played the coward or the traitor.”26 after all, there was a 
parallel in very recent memory, the failure of the english fleet under lord dart-
mouth to oppose William III’s invasion of england in 1688.
to complicate the issue further, the concept of fleet in being has come to be 
used very loosely, for a range of related naval options. Understanding the term as 
employed in twentieth- and twenty-first-century naval discussion, geoffrey till 
has identified within the concept four different types of operations, ranging from 
moderated offense to passive defense:27 
 1. obtaining a degree of command of the sea by temporarily avoiding a decision in 
battle.
 2. achieving positive strategic benefit by carrying out missions, such as attack on 
trade, while avoiding a decisive engagement with a superior enemy.
 3. Using continuous harassment and evasion of the enemy as a means of denying a 
superior enemy the unfettered use of the sea.
 4. Using actions designed merely to ensure the survival of a weaker opposing fleet.
the historian Jerker Widén has recently commented that these four variants con-
stitute collectively a potential problem for the proper interpretation of the fleet-
in-being concept. He argues that the fourth—actions merely to ensure a fleet’s 
survival—is not a legitimate form of fleet in being, which requires maintaining 
an active and credible threat against a superior enemy. the second and third 
are similar to one another, but they incorporate Corbett’s alternative method 
of disputing command of the sea—minor counterattacks. for theoretical pur-
poses, Widén recommends keeping conceptually separate the ideas of disputed 
command and minor counterattack. the fleet in being, he writes, is a defensive 
deterrent strategy by a weaker naval power, while minor counterattacks consti-
tute a limited form of offensive action within a defensive strategy. However, in 
practice, Widén notes, these two tend to coincide as separate elements of a single 
strategy.28 
THe naval war oF THe aMerican revolUTion
It was the famous british naval historian and strategist sir Julian Corbett who 
pointed out, in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, that the War of the ameri-
can revolution provided further evidence about the meaning and application of 
the concept of the fleet in being.29 
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In the first three years of the war, between 1775 and 1777, britain used its mili-
tary and naval resources to try to end the rebellion in North america quickly, but 
those attempts failed. In this period, relatively few british warships were built, but 
with france’s entry into the war in 1778 the royal Navy began a building program 
to try to recover the superiority of warship numbers and tonnage it had let slip to 
france. It would take the royal Navy years to recover that position. 
the year 1778 witnessed not only the entry of france into the war but the de-
parture of a french squadron under the comte d’estaing to North america and 
then to the West Indies. the government in london now changed its strategic 
priorities and put home defense and the protection of the colonies in the West 
Indies at a higher level than the issues at stake with the North american colonies. 
yet there were critics of this policy within the cabinet, notably the colonial sec-
retary, lord george germain, who led efforts that, from time to time, diverted 
the ministry from its initial intentions. as a result of this and other factors, 1778 
became a year of missed naval opportunities for both britain and france, as each 
in its turn looked across the atlantic. 
the french navy had the opportunity in 1778 to achieve something close to 
parity in naval strength with the royal Navy, even local superiority in european 
waters, by uniting the brest and toulon squadrons for a decisive battle. Instead, 
d’estaing took the toulon squadron to North america. at the same time, lon-
don, instead of using its strength to seek a decisive action with the french navy, 
dispatched vice admiral John byron and twenty ships to chase d’estaing across 
the atlantic. In the following year and a half neither of those fleets had any stra-
tegic effect in North american waters or even in the West Indies, where the naval 
battles they fought were indecisive. Meanwhile, in european waters, in the first 
major naval battle of the war, a french fleet under the comte d’orvilliers clashed, 
also indecisively, with a comparably sized british fleet in the first battle of Ushant 
on 27 July 1778.30
during the following autumn and winter the royal Navy and britain generally 
became further distracted by an argument that arose between two of the com-
manders at Ushant over their actions in that engagement: vice admiral sir Hugh 
Palliser and his superior, admiral the Honorable augustus Keppel. this personal 
and professional dispute resulted in courts-martial for them both; in Parliament, 
vicious disputes between the supporters of the respective admirals created a po-
litical opposition to the government. 
In the wake of all this, in the spring of 1779 the royal Navy needed to pre-
pare for a new campaign by finding a senior and experienced commander for 
the Channel fleet, a fighting admiral who was a supporter of the government. 
among the possible choices, there seemed to be no one who could meet all the 
necessary criteria. In the end, the selection fell on admiral sir Charles Hardy, a 
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very senior admiral who was above the political fray but had not been to sea in 
years. although Hardy had a reputation as a good-natured man, the divisive at-
mosphere of the day led some officers to refuse to serve under him. to back him 
up the admiralty turned to some untried officers who seemed to have potential. 
two captains in this group were promoted to rear admiral and given subordinate 
commands in the Channel fleet. another, Captain richard Kempenfelt, recog-
nized within the navy as a thoughtful reformer and tactical innovator, was given 
the post of Hardy’s captain of the fleet, a position that might be considered a 
precursor to a modern admiral’s chief of staff.31
as the Channel fleet prepared to put to sea in the spring of 1779, it was ham-
pered by a shortage of seamen, a shortage largely caused by the impressment of 
men carrying infectious diseases.32 at the same time, the strategic situation at sea 
was only gradually becoming clear to british leaders. In february, intelligence 
arrived in london that spain was beginning military preparations in the vicinity 
of gibraltar. In March, london learned that spain was fitting out warships at el 
ferrol, and france reportedly was preparing thirty-three at brest. at first british 
observers did not understand the full significance of these reports. It took them 
some time to conclude that spain was changing from a neutral mediator between 
britain and france to an active supporter of france against britain. It took even 
longer to understand that this franco-spanish alliance was tied strategically 
to the spanish siege of gibraltar and to a design to occupy part of england by 
amphibious assault to force britain to release gibraltar to spain in future peace 
negotiations.33 thus, the entry of spain into the war altered the strategic situation 
for britain.34
by July 1779 british officials were aware that a superior franco-spanish naval 
force was heading toward the Channel, but things were left in strategic suspense 
until it actually appeared off the british Isles. Meanwhile, senior british officers 
expressed a variety of opinions on the impending situation. some thought the 
enemy force would prove too unwieldy and ineffective to be a real threat in battle. 
In fact, the sixty-three-ship franco-spanish fleet would not actually be sighted 
entering the Channel until mid-august, by which time thirty thousand troops 
would be waiting in france to invade england. In the interim, Captain Kempen-
felt was at sea with admiral Hardy on board Hardy’s flagship, HMs victory, with 
some of the thirty-nine ships of the line of the Channel fleet. on 27 July 1779 
Kempenfelt wrote to his friend Captain Charles Middleton, the comptroller of the 
navy, reflecting on the strategic situation that he, as Hardy’s fleet captain, faced:
Much, I must say almost all, depends on this [i.e., the Channel] fleet; ’tis an inferior 
against a superior fleet; therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to coun-
teract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the favourable opportunity for 
action, and to catch the advantage of making the effort at some or other feeble part 
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of the enemy’s line; or if such opportunities don’t offer, to hover near the enemy, keep 
him at bay, and prevent his attempting to execute anything but at risk and hazard; 
to command their attention, and oblige them to think of nothing but being on their 
guard against your attack.35
In the event, actions such as these, combined with the collapse of supplies and of 
the health of seamen in the franco-spanish fleet, as well as the random effects of 
chance, eventually prevented the franco-spanish fleet from achieving success.36 
the war for america continued without major strategic gains on either side, 
with roughly equally matched fleets opposing one another, until 1781. In that 
year britain was successful in slowing the flow of naval stores—including timber, 
pitch, iron, and copper—to the spanish and french navies, thus raising their 
costs; otherwise the british blockade had little effect on the enemy. However, it 
did create a new naval enemy in european waters, the dutch republic, by in-
terfering with dutch trade to france. as a result, a british squadron fought the 
dutch fleet off dogger bank. Celebrated (although in fact tactically indecisive) as 
a victory by both sides, dogger bank became a british strategic victory when the 
dutch fleet failed to venture out again during the remainder of the war.37 In 1781, 
the combined franco-spanish fleet returned to the Channel, again in strength 
too great for the royal Navy’s Channel fleet to dare challenge. 
Meanwhile, in september 1781, the strategic crisis of the war occurred when 
the comte de grasse was able to seize and maintain local command of the sea off 
virginia to control the waters around the Chesapeake Capes and in Chesapeake 
bay for several weeks, preventing relief from reaching british forces ashore at 
yorktown. general lord Cornwallis’s surrender eventually brought down the 
ministry in london and replaced it with a government that was pledged to end-
ing the war. yet it would be some time before all that happened.
In this situation, lord sandwich at the admiralty and his professional advis-
ers, who included Captain Charles Middleton, Captain lord Mulgrave, and rich-
ard Kempenfelt (promoted to rear admiral in 1780 and now in command of the 
Western squadron of the Channel fleet), proposed a dramatic new strategy. at 
this point, britain’s warship-building program, begun after the war started, was 
beginning to alter the strategic balance of forces between the combined french 
and spanish fleets and britain’s. the numerical superiority of the bourbon naval 
powers in capital ships in comparison to britain’s grew from 25 percent in 1775 
to a high point in 1780 of 44 percent. from 1780 to 1785 it declined to a low of a 
17 percent superiority.38 the percentages in numerical superiority, however, do 
not reflect differences in fleet readiness. as the french navy increased in size, it 
experienced increasing difficulties in manning and funding.39 Nevertheless, in 
the context of this overall situation, the royal Navy’s Channel fleet remained 
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considerably weaker than that in the West Indies. the cabinet in london had 
made a deliberate strategic choice to attempt a victory in the West Indies rather 
than in european waters. Its rationale might be justified by admiral sir george 
rodney’s victory on 12 april 1782 over de grasse at the saintes, preventing the 
loss of Jamaica. yet rodney’s victory was not the kind of stunning strategic vic-
tory that could end a war, despite its considerable moral effect. the high-risk 
strategy that brought it about left more serious vulnerabilities exposed at home.40 
While the ministry placed priority on the West Indies and reduced naval 
strength in the eastern atlantic and North sea to do so, the royal Navy at home 
still had essential duties to carry out as an inferior fleet in being, unable to con-
duct a major fleet battle. Most importantly, the government’s decision meant 
that the royal Navy could not maintain control of the Western approaches to 
the Channel with a sufficient number of its largest warships. such a force at that 
important naval strategic position at sea had traditionally served the multiple 
purposes of protecting british trade, attacking enemy trade, preventing inva-
sion, and deterring french forces from leaving brest for overseas missions.41 at 
the same time, the war with the dutch required a blockade of the dutch coast 
to prevent the dutch navy from returning to sea. Meanwhile, british warships in 
the North sea served to blockade the eastern approaches of the Channel and to 
intercept merchant ships carrying contraband naval stores to france. In addition, 
the war with spain called for a blockade of spanish ports, as well as the convoying 
of supplies for the relief of gibraltar during the spanish siege. all of this needed 
to be done while avoiding a major, decisive fleet battle. the royal Navy met this 
conundrum on an operational level by shuttling ships back and forth between the 
North sea and the Channel as the situation required and by maintaining superior 
ship-to-ship fighting capabilities.42
as for the broad, strategic level, however, rear admiral Kempenfelt explained 
his views of the theoretical aspects of the situation in early January 1782, after 
receiving admiralty orders for his Western squadron. In comparison with tor-
rington’s single-sentence statement, Kempenfelt’s thoughts, as sir Julian Corbett 
considered, represented the “developed idea of the ‘fleet in being’” that showed 
how the concept had matured in british naval thinking some ninety years after 
torrington:43
When the enemy’s force by sea [are]a superior to yours and you have many remote 
possessions to guard, it renders it difficult to determine [what may be]b the best man-
ner of disposing of your ships.
 a. the 13 January version replaces “is” with “are.”
 b. the 13 January version adds “what may be.”
9
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[When the enemy’s designs are known],c in order to do something effectual, you must 
endeavour to be superior to them in [such parts]d where, [if they should succeed in 
their design],e they would most injure you. 
If your fleet is so divided as to be in all places inferior to the enemy, they will then in 
all places have [the probability]f of succeeding in their attempts. 
[If a squadron of sufficient force cannot be formed to face the enemy at home, it 
would be more eligible to let the number of that squadron be yet less, that thereby 
you may be enabled to gain a superiority elsewhere].g
When inferior to the enemy, and you have only a squadron of observation to watch 
and attend upon their motions, such squadron should be composed of two-decked 
ships only,44 as [to answer its purpose]h it must have the advantage [in sailing of the 
enemy, otherwise in certain circumstances they may be forced to action or to give up 
some of their heavy sailers.]i
It is highly [expedient]j to have such a flying squadron to hang [about]k the enemy’s 
large fleet, as it will prevent their dividing into [squadrons]l for intercepting your 
trade [or other purposes],m or spreading [and extending]n their ships for a more 
 c. the 13 January version replaces “When you know the enemy’s designs” with the words between 
brackets.
 d. the 13 January version replaces “some part” with the words between brackets.
 e. the 13 January version replaces “if they succeeded” with the words between brackets.
 f. the 13 January version replaces “a fair chance” with the words between brackets.
 g. the 13 January version creates a new paragraph here and replaces “If a squadron cannot be formed 
of sufficient force to face the enemy’s at home, it would be more advantageous to let your inferiority 
be still greater, in order by it to gain the superiority elsewhere” with the words between brackets.
 h. the 13 January version replaces “as to ensure its purpose” with the words between brackets and 
eliminates the period after “purpose.”
 i. the 13 January version replaces “of the enemy in sailing; else, under certain circumstances it will 
be liable to be forced to battle” with the words between brackets. “Heavy sailers” refers to slow, 
cumbersome, unweatherly ships, rather than simply large ones. 
 j. the 13 January version starts a new paragraph with this sentence and replaces “necessary” with 
“expedient.”
 k. the 13 January version replaces “on” with “about.”
 l. the 13 January version omits the word “separate” before “squadrons.”
 m. the 13 January version adds the words between brackets.
 n. the 13 January version adds the words between brackets.
10
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extensive view. [such a squadron will be always at hand ready]o to profit from any 
accidental separation or dispersion of their [ships]p from hard gales, fogs or other 
causes. [they]q may intercept supplies, intelligence, etc. to them. In fine, such a 
squadron will be a check and restraint upon their [activity],r and thereby prevent 
[much]s of that mischief they otherwise might do.
When the enemy are near the Channel, I should suppose the best situation for such 
a squadron would be to keep without them to the westward[, as more favourable to 
protect your ships coming into the Channel. the squadron will also be more at lib-
erty for its operations to approach or keep distance from the enemy as they may find 
convenient, and not liable to be forced into port and blocked up].t
When the enemy [perceive]u your design of keeping the North sea free by a stout 
squadron for your trade to return home that way, it may be supposed they will detach 
from [their]v grand fleet as many ships as the inferiority of your Western squadron 
will allow to endeavour, in conjunction with the dutch, to turn in that sea, the bal-
ance of power on their side.45 [but probably they will penetrate into this scheme of 
ours time enough to prevent its good effects this ensuing summer, and other projects 
they may have in view to attempt with their grand fleet may divert their attention 
from it.]w
the enemy I conceive [have]x at this time two grand designs against us: the one, the 
conquest of our West India Islands; the other, at home, not confined merely to the 
interception of our trade, but to favour by [the superiority of their fleet]y a formidable 
 o. the 13 January version replaces “you will be at hand” with the words between brackets.
 p. the 13 January version replaces “fleet” with “ships.”
 q. the 13 January version replaces “you” with “they.”
 r. the 13 January version replaces “motions” with “activity.”
 s. the 13 January version replaces “a good deal” with “much.”
 t. the 13 January version adds the section between brackets, ending the paragraph with the additional 
words.
 u. the 13 January version replaces “perceives” with “perceive.”
 v. the 13 January version replaces “the” with “their.”
 w. the 13 January version adds the sentence between brackets.
 x. the 13 January version adds the word “have.”
 y. the 13 January version replaces “their superiority” with the words between brackets.
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descent upon great britain; z and I [would]aa suppose the blow would be directed 
where it would be most felt by us, either against the Metropolis or Portsmouth. I 
should rather think the latter, as [more practicable]bb from the nature of the navigation.
they will with some reason conclude that [one]cc of those designs will succeed; 
[knowing]dd that we cannot, by our naval power, guard against both, and that if we 
employ a force sufficient to defeat their design in one place, we must necessarily leave 
the other exposed to them.
[It may be (or might have been) in our power to send such a force of ships to the 
West Indies as would frustrate their designs there, but at home I imagine, with our 
outmost exertions, we must remain inferior by sea and trust our defence from a 
descent to our land forces.
as our ships are now all coppered, they are always ready for service; therefore, when 
the enemy’s fleet at the end of the campaign returns into port, which hitherto has 
been always early in the fall, you are then at liberty to send what number of ships you 
might think proper to act offensively or defensively in the West Indies during the 
winter months, and have them again at home in sufficient time for summer service.
there is great advantage upon such occasions in letting ships slip out singly, as their 
voyage is thereby rendered much shorter, and your design a secret.]ee
on the first of the two drafts of Kempenfelt’s document, sir Charles Middleton 
had written a short note that clarified the reasoning and was later incorporated in 
the final version sent to lord sandwich: “as something must [be] left exposed, it 
appears to me that great britain and Ireland are now more capable of defending 
themselves than our colonies; and that the present year will probably pass over 
before they discover our design in the North sea. It behooves us thus to make the 
best of the time allowed us.”46
to sir Julian Corbett’s way of thinking, Kempenfelt had already demonstrated, 
practically and “in the most positive and convincing manner,” the positive side 
of the fleet-in-being theory a few weeks before drafting his memorandum.47 
fifty-three leagues (approximately 159 nautical miles, or 294 kilometers) south-
west of the Ushant on 12 december 1781, Kempenfelt’s Western squadron had 
 z. the 13 January version omits “and Ireland.”
 aa. the 13 January version replaces “should” with “would.”
 bb. the 13 January version replaces “less difficult” with “more practicable.”
 cc. the 13 January version replaces “one or the other” with “one.”
 dd. the 13 January version replaces “well knowing” with “knowing.”
 ee. the 13 January version adds the three final paragraphs, shown here within brackets.
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encountered a french hundred-ship convoy sailing, under the escort of the comte 
de guichen, from brest with military supplies and reinforcements for the east 
and West Indies. observing that de guichen and his escorting warships were over 
the horizon, hull-down to leeward, Kempenfelt attempted to cut them off from 
the transports. Partially succeeding in this, Kempenfelt avoided a major action 
and took nine transports from among the hundred ships, as well as, on the fol-
lowing day, an additional five stragglers.
a number of critics of the action—including King george III, rear admiral 
sir samuel Hood, and admiral lord rodney—thought that Kempenfelt should 
have followed the french squadron and taken more ships, even to the extent of 
going all the way to the West Indies to tip the naval balance there, rather than 
returning home. at the tactical level, Kempenfelt’s skillful action in using an infe-
rior force to embarrass the enemy and to take prizes in the presence of its escort 
was remarkable, but strategically it had little effect.48 the strategic effect related to 
the convoy was caused by the weather on Christmas day, five days after Kempen-
felt returned to spithead, when a violent storm forced most of the french convoy 
back into port and prevented the rest from reaching its intended destination. 
Word of Kempenfelt’s action, along with the news of the surrender of the 
british army at yorktown (and the failure of the royal Navy to relieve it), had 
arrived at london in late November and led to political attacks in the House of 
Commons on lord North’s ministry for naval mismanagement. eleven days after 
Kempenfelt submitted his memorandum to lord sandwich, the House voted “to 
inquire into the causes of the lack of success of his Majesty’s naval forces during 
this war, and more particularly in the year 1781,” the first of a series of resolutions 
and charges that on 20 March 1782 forced lord North’s ministry from office, 
along with lord sandwich as first lord of the admiralty.49 during the course of 
the debates, the young opposition politician Charles James fox pointed out that 
the government’s strategy had been the reverse of what it should have been. that 
is, he argued, having limited naval resources it sent major squadrons to distant 
stations and left home waters exposed when it should have concentrated in eu-
ropean waters, where it could have controlled enemy forces at their source while 
at the same time providing for home defense.50 
Kempenfelt’s and Middleton’s thinking showed that their defensive, fleet-in-
being strategy was based on a number of factors related to the specific context 
of the strategic situation in late 1781 and early 1782. at the tactical and opera-
tional levels, their thinking depended on a growing sense that the enemy’s naval 
strength was becoming weaker in size and less unified in action.51 In proposing 
more daring moves they were depending on this trend, as well as on easy strategic 
maneuverability of their own naval forces from one theater of operations to an-
other; on subterfuge; on the enemy’s limited ability to guess what they were doing 
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and counter it; and on the (at least marginal) technological superiority provided 
by copper sheathing of the underwater hulls of ships, as well as on the adoption 
of carronades, which would prove their value as a new form of ordnance during 
the battle of the saintes.52
at the strategic level, the application of the concept that Kempenfelt and 
Middleton were advocating abdicated the royal Navy’s traditional role as britain’s 
first line of defense, leaving home defense to the british army and to the militia 
at the beaches. It also assumed that the constraining effects of wind, weather, 
and inefficiency on the enemy’s naval force would be less for the british. at the 
same time, it abandoned a strategic idea that had been proved valid in the past 
and would later be proved again in subsequent wars—that by maintaining naval 
superiority in european waters the royal Navy could eliminate or reduce (as fox 
argued on the floor of the Commons) the threat to overseas possessions at the 
source, by preventing french and spanish forces from sailing to distant stations.
this discussion should not lead a reader to think that the idea of the fleet in 
being was one that was widely understood or discussed in the royal Navy of 
the eighteen and nineteenth centuries. admiral Kempenfelt was certainly a very 
unusual naval officer, a man whose thinking was not widely reflected in the brit-
ish naval officer corps.53 the instances and documents mentioned here are the 
only known examples to have existed before Colomb opened the idea for wider 
discussion as a general strategic concept in 1891. In both the 1690 example and 
that of the War of the american revolution, the royal Navy’s use of the fleet-in-
being concept resulted in severe political repercussions for those who were held 
responsible. In 1690, the commanding admiral was blamed, in 1782 the govern-
ment. to the extent that the royal Navy employed a fleet in being, it was not a 
war-winning strategy but a delaying gambit, or a device to protract the war at sea 
so as to achieve other objectives. at beachy Head, its apparent success for the 
english navy was due largely to the inefficiency of the enemy and other factors 
within the larger context of that war. during the War of the american revolu-
tion, however, a strategy of fleet in being in home waters had a role in allowing 
the royal Navy to strengthen rodney’s fleet in the West Indies to the point that 
he could win the battle of the saintes on 9–12 april 1782.
the ideas on a fleet in being that richard Kempenfelt and Charles Middleton 
discussed during the final phase of the War of the american revolution certainly 
represented an elaboration of an idea that had been only hinted at in admiral 
lord torrington’s single sentence. their elaborated concept is more than an ex-
pansion on the original idea, and it expresses a much more precise meaning than 
Philip Colomb and a number of other commentators have allowed. an enemy 
cannot, as a strategic matter, entirely ignore such a fleet, presenting as it does 
an active threat that requires a significant response. In the context of a strategic 
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situation involving naval forces dispersed in several geographic areas, an active 
and aggressive fleet in being can potentially serve as a temporary deterrent in 
one area, if for a very limited time, simultaneously maintaining morale and op-
erational skills within that fleet and gaining time to concentrate forces in another 
area where a larger threat exists. the historical experiences that have been dis-
cussed here suggest, however, that it is a high-risk strategy to deal with particular 
circumstances, to be considered only when resources are strained and threats 
dispersed in different geographical areas, not to be expanded into the rationale 
for a general strategic naval posture.
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